"Extreme caution" standard of care in 49 C.F.R. § 392.14 preempts any lower standard under state laws
State tort laws generally define the duty of drivers as ordinary care under an ordinary negligence standard. Occasionally, as in a guest passenger situation in Alabama, state law sets a different standard such as requiring proof of "willful or wanton" conduct in order to hold a defendant liable. However, when a motor carrier driver is driving in adverse weather, an "extreme caution" standard under 49 C.F.R. § 392.14 preempts any lower standard under state law.
The Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution provides that any state law that conflicts with a federal law is "without effect." Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 , (1981) citing McCullough v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819); see also U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2. Federal law displaces state law where (1) Congress expressly preempts state law; (2) congressional intent to preempt is inferred from the existence of a pervasive regulatory scheme; or (3) state law conflicts with federal law or interferes with the achievement of federal objectives. Hodges v. Delta Airlines Inc.,44 F.3d 334, 336 (5th Cir. 1995). The Supremacy Clause invalidates state laws that "interfere with or are contrary to" federal law. (Hillsborough County, Fla. v. Automated Medical Labs., Inc. 471 U.S. 707,712(1985).)
49 C.F.R. § 392.2 provides:
"[e]very commercial motor vehicle must be operated in accordance with the laws, ordinances, and regulations of the jurisdiction in which it is being operated. However, if a regulation of the Federal Highway Administration imposes a higher standard of care than that law, ordinance or regulation, the Federal Highway Administration regulation must be complied with.
In addition, 49 C.F.R. 392.14 provides, “if a regulation of a Federal Highway Administration imposes a higher standard of care than that law, ordinance, or regulation, the Federal Highway Administration must be complied with.”
The express purpose of the Federal Regulations is to protect the traveling public by imposing financial responsibility on carriers. Mellon National Bank v. Sophie Lines, 289 F.2d 473, 474 (3rd Cir. 1961); Planet Ins. v. Transport Indemnity, 823 F.2d 286, 287 (9th Cir. 1987); Rodriguez v. Sammons Trucking Co., 705 F.2d 1229, 1235 (10th Cir. 1983); Carolina Cos, Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of North America, 595 F.2d 128, 137 (3rd Cir. 1979).
49 C.F.R. § 392.14 provides:
Hazardous conditions; extreme caution.
Extreme caution in the operation of a commercial motor vehicle shall be exercised when hazardous conditions, such as those caused by snow, ice, sleet, fog, mist, rain, dust, or smoke, adversely affect visibility or traction. Speed shall be reduced when such conditions exist. If conditions become sufficiently dangerous, the operation of the commercial motor vehicle shall be discontinued and shall not be resumed until the commercial motor vehicle can be safely operated. Whenever compliance with the foregoing provisions of this rule increases hazard to passengers, the commercial motor vehicle may be operated to the nearest point at which the safety of passengers is assured.
49 C.F.R. § 392.14 fulfills the express preemption requirement in that it expressly requires compliance with a FMCSR that imposes a standard higher than state laws. 49 C.F.R. § 392.14 also satisfies the “conflict” test of the preemption doctrine in that the lower standard of "negligence" under most state tort law, or “willful or wanton” conduct under the Alabama guest statute, would stand as an obstacle to the express requirement of the federal regulation by allowing drivers of commercial vehicles to escape liability for injuries resulting from failure to exercise the required “extreme caution” standard. Thus, pursuant to the U.S. Constitution and well-established precedent, the Federal Regulations apply.
Ken Shigley, Shigley Law Firm, LLC, Atlanta, GA
http://shigleylaw.com
http://atlantainjurylawyer.com
